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GIVE ME LIBERTY AND GIVE ME DEATH:
THE RIGHT TO DIE AND THE CALIFORNIA
NATURAL DEATH ACT
Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
It seems to me most strange that men should fear;
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come.
Shakespeare
Julius Caesar
Act II, Scene II
INTRODUCTION
When Shakespeare wrote Julius Caesar, men had no need
to worry about their right to die. It was inevitable. Then, as
now, death was a subject both fascinating and repelling. Fasci-
nating because of its mystery, it was, nevertheless, something
to be dreaded. Today, the problems surrounding death have
taken on dimensions not possible in the sixteenth century.
Twentieth century medical technology challenges the inevi-
tability of death. With respirators, transplants, and "miracle
drugs," people can be kept "alive" long past any point
imagined by those living only fifty years ago. For many, these
new procedures are a miracle. Vaccines for diseases like small-
pox and polio, new treatments for measles, and a host of other
medical developments, have meant that many who would have
died or have been seriously impaired can live out their lives
normally. These "miracles" are a nightmare for others. The
same procedures and machines that bring life to the young
often give to the terminally ill only an extension of their pain.
Often they are physically dependent on others. When these
people ask to have the treatments stopped, the machines re-
moved, to simply "be left alone," society's answer is, too
often-no.
The answer should be yes, but many courts are afraid the
right to die, or so called "passive euthanasia,"" will result in
o 1980 by Chris Beraldo
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eugenics or criminal and civil liability for medical personnel.
Since the judiciary is reluctant to recognize the right to die,
legislative action is needed. This comment will focus in turn
on the philosophical issues presented by the right to die, the
constitutional basis for the right, and California's attempt to
resolve the issue through legislation.2
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
The law is society's means of protecting and enforcing
fundamental values. To develop a system that effectively im-
plements those values, the values themselves must be ex-
amined and understood. American society holds liberty as its
most fundamental value. The right to die falls under the pro-
tection of liberty. Predictably, many treatments of this issue
by courts and commentators have been confused, emotional
responses to a sensitive subject.8 The values affected by the
right to die must be analyzed before a legal solution to this
problem can be developed. The analysis in turn considers two
aspects of the right to die: how the right derives from liberty;
and what considerations justify limitation of the right.
Liberty and the Right To Die
The right to die, along with privacy, the right to bodily
integrity, and several other constitutionally protected rights,
passive euthanasia. "Passive euthanasia is the omission of procedures or medications
that extend a patient's life while active euthanasia entails procedures which hasten
death." Vaughan, The Right to Die, 10 CAL. WEST L. REV. 613 (1973-74).
Euthanasia has a Greek origin: eu (easy, happy, painless), thanatos
(death). The term apparently first appeared in the English language in
the early seventeenth century in its original meaning-a gentle, easy
death .... More recently it has come to mean the act or practice of
bringing about a gentle, easy death. In its broad sense, euthanasia em-
braces a variety of situations, some where the patient is capable of con-
senting to his death, others where he obviously is not .... In the
1930's there sprung up organizations in both England and America
which dramatized the plight of the patient in "unnecessary" pain and
urged euthanasia for the uncurable and suffering patient who wanted to
die.
Kamisar, Some Non-religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation,
42 MINN. L. Rzv. 969, 969-70 n.3 (1957).
2. California has attempted to resolve this issue through the California Natural
Death Act. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1980).
3. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971); Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (1964); Kamisar, supra note 1.
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falls under the umbrella of liberty.
The concept of liberty encompasses two basic types of
freedom: "freedom from" and "freedom to." "Freedom from"
is the absence of restraint, sanction, or interference generally
in a person's life. Freedom from external impediments was
highly prized by the philosophers of the seventeenth century.
This freedom, said Hobbes, was the underlying reason for the
formulation of societies-that men might be free from the re-
straints that made life in a state of nature nasty, brutish, and
short.5 The philosophers of The Enlightenment' suppla-
mented this emphasis on "freedom from" by developing an
emphasis on the "freedom to."' 7 The two concepts are interre-
lated because freedom from interference is often a prerequi-
site to exercise of the freedom to do or act. If a man wishes to
espouse a particular political belief, and to convey that belief
to others, he must be free. Free from physical restraint by
those who disagree with his views. Unless men are physically
able to act, by virtue of a freedom from restraints, the free-
dom to do cannot exist. The freedom to do guarantees the
right of individual choice. It is through choice that this free-
dom is primarily exercised. "Freedom from" prevents one per-
son from imposing his values and ideas upon another. It thus
guarantees an individual the right to control the course his
own life will take.
The right to privacy lies within both "freedom from" and
"freedom to." Privacy affords an individual protection for
intimate matters. In a positive, "freedom to" sense, privacy
offers the right to make choices about intimate matters. The
negative, "freedom from" aspect of privacy guarantees the
right to be left alone while making and exercising these
choices. A specific instance of the right to be left alone is the
right to be free from bodily invasion, such as forced medical
treatment. The positive concomitant of this is the right to
choose what medical treatments will be administered.
4. See, e.g., IV B. DESPINOZA, ETHIC OF BENEDICT DESPINOZA (1927); J. LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE ON CVIL GOVERNMENT (1955).
5. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 107 (1958).
6. "Enlightenment is primarily a cultural historian's broad designation for a
historical period, roughly the eighteenth century, in Western society. As a cultural
period it is more closely linked with. . . formal philosophical thought than any other
in the West." 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 519 (1967).
7. See, e.g., J.J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1947); J. BENTHAM, THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1948).
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The right to die, like the privacy right, can be thought of
as an aspect of both "freedom from" and "freedom to." It is
an extension of "freedom from" as it is a specific exercise of
the right to be free from bodily invasion. It falls under "free-
dom to," because it is a positive choice, made by an individ-
ual, to allow nature's course in death.
How Much Liberty? Limiting Liberty and the Right To Die
American society has accepted the value of liberty axio-
matically. In the words of J.S. Mill, "It is useful ... that the
worth of different modes of life should be proven practically,
when anyone thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short,
that . . . individuality should assert itself."8 Furthering lib-
erty is good. There is an inherent tension, however, between
unrestrained individual liberty and the rights of other mem-
bers of society. Thus, some constraints must be placed on an
individual's freedom to act, but how can we best choose the
limits to place on our actions?
One method advanced for constructing limitations is the
formulation of positive directives.' A chosen few decide that
which they think to be the best mode of living. All others in
the society then conform their behavior to the prescribed set
of standards. This approach often underlies the arguments of
those who would deny to people the right to die. At least one
court has decided that life is better than death.10 The individ-
ual, therefore, must conform. His choice of death is not in his
best interest, in the opinion of those who have set the stan-
dards." Yet, this method of choosing limitations is too restric-
tive. Certainly if liberty is good, and to be fostered, the best
formula for setting limitations would be one allowing the
greatest amount of freedom, while still avoiding the dangers of
absolute freedom.
The potential danger inherent in absolute freedom seems
to be the threat of harm to one (or more) member of society
through the exercise of freedom by another member. Harm,
then, is to be the yardstick by which limitations on a man's
8. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (1956).
9. See, e.g., C. SAINT-SIMON, SELECTED WRITINGS (F. Markham ed. 1952).
10. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279
A.2d 670, 673 (1971).
11. See, e.g., id.
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freedom to act are measured. Again, Mill writes:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individu-
ally or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their members, is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.1'
How much harm and what kind of harm justifies societal
interference with a person's actions? Since liberty occupies a
place of paramount importance, the harm that must be shown
to override it is substantial. Actions that would cause substan-
tial interference with the right of another to pursue his life
would seem to be great enough to override a person's other-
wise paramount right to liberty. The harms inherent in mur-
der or theft would justify society in restraining one of its
members from acting. Minor forms of harm, such as displea-
sure caused by the style of another's clothing, or sadness
caused by disappointments such as unrequited love, that are
really annoyances or vexations rather than harms, would not
justify restraints on freedom to act.
Using the harm yardstick, one must ask whether there is
a justification for preventing exercise of the right to die? An
elderly patient is suffering from terminal cancer and wishes to
exercise his right to die. What effect will his choice have upon
other members of society?
The first and most obvious harm that might flow from a
person's exercise of the right to die is society's loss of a con-
tributing citizen. Yet, this patient is dependent upon equip-
ment to continue his existence, and because this equipment is
available to him only while he is physically confined, society
will not be deprived of his physical labor. The patient, how-
ever, may still be capable of making useful mental contribu-
tions. Is society's loss of the patient's mental labor a sufficient
harm to warrant refusal of the right to die? American society
does not force its members to perform simply because they
are capable of making a particular contribution.1' Addition-
12. J. MILL, supra note 8, at 13.
13. "The notion that the individual exists for the good of the state is, of course,
antithetical to our fundamental thesis that the role of the state is to ensure a maxi-
mum of individual freedom of choice and conduct." In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
1980]
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ally, the quality of forced mental labor would likely be poor."'
The effect of this loss on society is not substantial enough to
suspend the patient's right to die.
What effect will the patient's choice have on the medical
personnel involved in caring for him? Two possibly negative
results might stem from a patient's right to die: liability and
violation of personal or ethical standards. Criminal and civil
liability can be eliminated by judicial or legislative provision.
Along with this provision absolving medical personnel from li-
ability, a provision preventing violation of personnel stan-
dards can be included. Medical personnel so wishing could be
relieved from participating in the effectuation of the patient's
choice to die. If these two potential harms can be so easily
remedied, they do not justify denying the patient's liberty.
Finally, we must examine the effect of the patient's
choice on his family and friends. Some may be happy because
he will no longer be suffering. Others, however, may be dis-
tressed by his death. Although the emotional distress caused
by the death of a friend or relative affects a person's life, that
harm is not great enough to outweigh the patient's interest in
controlling his body and choosing to die. Philosophically,
therefore, prohibition of the right to die cannot be justified.
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To Dm
Support for a Constitutional Right To Die
Although most courts have not recognized a right to die
based on the constitutional right of privacy, support for this
right exists, both in the United States Constitution and in
case law.
The Bill of Rights" contains several provisions that ex-
pressly guarantee aspects of the privacy right. The first
amendment guarantees freedom of speech," of the press,
and of religious exercise." These rights are generally thought
of as guaranteeing a right to make a positive choice. They also
implicitly guarantee a right to be free from interference or
14. See A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE FIRsT CIRCLE (1968), for perspectives on the
Soviet Union's experiences with this coercion of mental labor.
15. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 4.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
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sanction while exercising that right of positive choice. 19 The
third,"0 fourth,21 and fifth" amendments provide explicit
guarantees of specific instances of the right to be left alone.
Additionally, the fourteenth amendment, with its guarantee of
liberty,'3 confers the right of privacy, since privacy is sub-
sumed by liberty. Justice Brandeis recognized that these guar-
antees were intended to secure the right to be left alone. In
his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,' Justice Brandeis
observed that by these amendments the "makers of our Con-
stitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the right
to be left alone." 5
More recently, the Court has found a constitutionally
protected interest in a situation closely analogous to that of
the right to die-the abortion cases, Roe v. Wadese and Doe v.
Bolton.27 In Roe v. Wade, the Court cited several cases deal-
ing with matters protected by the right of privacy. Most of the
cited cases involved intimate decisions or other important
matters dealing with family life and procreation." In particu-
lar, Eisenstadt v. Baird" suggests that the right to be left
alone extends to other decisions involving matters that are
intimate and important. 0 In that case the Court described the
19. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled disclosure of
membership interferes with first amendment freedom of association).
20. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner .... "U.S. CONsT. amend. III, cl. 1.
21. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons .... against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV,
cl. 1.
22. "No person shall . . .be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5.
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
24. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
25. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See note 30 infra.
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(education); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (procreation).
29. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
30. In Eisenstadt the Court quotes with approval the following portion of
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead:
The Makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their be-
liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
1980] 977
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right of privacy as "the right of the individual, married or sin-
gle, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.""1 This definition sets forth
three important factors for extending the application of the
privacy right: 1) to whom does the right apply; 2) when (or
with regard to what activities) may the right be invoked; and,
3) what protection does the right afford? In outlining the first
factor, the Court emphasized the fact that privacy protects in-
dividuals.8 ' Because the right attaches to individuals, as well
as relationships," a person need not be involved in, nor in-
voke any special relationship, such as marriage, in order to
secure the protection offered by the privacy right. The right
may be invoked to protect activities that "fundamentally"
affect a person's life. 4 The protection afforded these "funda-
mental" activities is freedom from unwarranted governmental
intrusion: the government must have some substantial or com-
pelling reason to interfere with these activities."
In Roe v. Wade, the Court found that a woman's abortion
decision fell within this definition, and was, therefore, pro-
tected by the constitutional right of privacy. 6 The Court had
little doubt that such a decision would fundamentally affect a
person. "The detriment that the state would impose upon the
pregnant woman by denying the choice altogether is appar-
ent. '8 7 The Court noted a variety of factors that demonstrate
the intimate nature and personal impact of the abortion
decision.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Id. at 453 n.10 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (1928)).
31. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
32. Id.
33. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy protects the mari-
tal relationship).
34. 405 U.S. at 453.
35. Id. at 453 n.10, where the Court quoted the opinion in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). "[Allso fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted government intrusions into one's privacy."
36. 410 U.S. at 154.
37. Id. at 153.
[Vol. 20978
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be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing the child into a family already
unable psychologically or otherwise, to care for it."8
The Court concluded that any limitation on a person's right
to make personal decisions having such important repercus-
sions must be justified by some compelling state interest.
Many of these considerations that support the Court's in-
clusion of the abortion decision within the right to privacy
also play -an important role in the patient's choice of passive
euthanasia. Like the pregnant woman, the detriment that
would be imposed by the state on the dying patient by deny-
ing all choice is very apparent. The person who is refused the
right to die faces an unwanted extension of physical pain and
immobility. A person forced to continue such an existence cer-
tainly faces "a distressful life and future." 9 Psychological
harm is also inflicted-from pain, from the effects of drugs,
and from the knowledge that one is a burden to family and
friends. The family of the dying patient, like that of the un-
wanted child, may be unable, psychologically or otherwise, to
deal with the problems that a forced extension of the patient's
life would impose.
All of these considerations point to the fact that the exer-
cise of the right to die affects a person at least as fundamen-
tally as does the woman's abortion decision. This decision is
not only fundamental, but the privacy interest in exercising
the right to die is of a more intimate nature than that of the
decision to terminate a pregnancy. The Court found abortion
inherently different from other situations covered by the right
of privacy.' 0 In these other privacy cases, the decisions made
affected only their maker. Unlike these cases, the termination
of a pregnancy affects a potentially independent creature.4'
For this reason, the Court found that "[t]he pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy."' 2 Unlike the pregnant wo-
38. Id.
39. See D. MAGUiRE, DEATH BY CHOICE 7-48 (1974) for a description of the dis-
pair and hopelessness felt by a patient when denied the choice of passive euthanasia.
40. "The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education,
with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and
Meyer were respectively concerned." 410 U.S. at 159.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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man, the decision of the person choosing to die affects only
himself. He, therefore, can be more isolated in his privacy.
In Whalen v. Roe, the Court implicitly recognized a pri-
vacy interest in independent choice regarding medical treat-
ment.48 The plaintiffs in Whalen claimed that their privacy
interest in making "decisions about matters vital to the care
of their health" 44 without a governmental interference was
improperly affected by a statute that required registration of
patients receiving certain drugs. Although the Court recog-
nized that the statute had deterred some valid use of the sub-
ject drugs,'45 they nevertheless held that the intrusion on pri-
vacy was not "sufficiently grievous" to require constitutional
protection."6
The Whalen court also recognized a right to be free of
governmental invasion and disclosure of personal matters.7
Here, too, the Court found the plaintiffs had not produced ev-
idence of harm or intrusion sufficient to find a constitutional
violation.4' The Court noted that the information collected by
the government during the registration process was already
given to or known by many people in the normal course of
medical treatment. 4 Further, the Court found the safeguards
in the statute sufficiently protected against misuse of the in-
formation.50 Thus, the result in Whalen was based on the
statute's minimal intrusion on privacy interests.
The right to die arguably falls within the right to choose
medical treatment, it is a choice not to have a particular treat-
ment. Indeed, the privacy interests in choosing not to undergo
medical treatment are stronger than those in Whalen where
the plaintiffs wished to receive a regulated treatment. Forced
medical treatment is not an intrusion that occurs regularly. In
the normal course of medical treatment, consent must usually
be obtained before treating the patient. Unlike the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiffs in Whalen, prohibiting refusal of medi-
cal treatment in the context of the right to die would inflict
43. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
44. Id. at 600.
45. Id. at 603.
46. Id. at 600.
47. Id. at 599.
48. Id. at 604.
49. Id. at 602.
50. Id. at 601-02.
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substantial harm upon a person. Bodily integrity is violated
and control over one's person is lost. The patient will suffer
physically, psychologically, and possibly, monetarily."
The right to die is thus a fundamental right, protected
under the broader right of privacy and the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of liberty. Like liberty itself, however, it is
not absolute. Like the right of privacy, the right to die will be
legally protected only when there are no countervailing com-
pelling state interests.
Developing a Constitutional Test To Protect the Right To
Die
In protecting the privacy interest in Roe, the Court ap-
plied maximum scrutiny, since it had found that the state
action (in Roe, a state statute) 3 affected a fundamental
right." Since the right to die falls within the fundamental
right of privacy, it too should be protected by a maximum
scrutiny type of test. Utilizing maximum scrutiny as a guide, a
practical test can be developed to protect the right to die.
Because social policy favors the exercise of individual
liberty, maximum scrutiny assumes that the right under con-
sideration is being validly exercised. The state, seeking to re-
strain the right, must show that its restraint is furthering a
compelling state interest." In light of the philosophical con-
siderations discussed above, the only interest a state could
offer would be prevention of substantial harm to the patient
asserting the right to die."
The second prong of maximum scrutiny requires that any
restraint of a fundamental right to further a compelling state
interest must be the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest. 7 This maximum scrutiny test could provide protec-
tion for the right to die in a broad range of cases. What fac-
51. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
52. 410 U.S. at 155.
53. Id. at 117.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id.
56. It is interesting to note that one of the only instances in which the Court
has upheld state action that deprived a person of a fundamental right was in Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The ground for upholding the action in
that case was the prevention of what was believed at the time to be substantial harm
to society.
57. 410 U.S. at 155.
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tors should be considered in determining whether a situation
falls within the conduct protected by the right to die?
Between active suicide and the plight of the terminally ill
patient, exists a continuum of situations that may or may not
be covered by the right to die.a8 In determining whether a per-
son's situation should be protected by the right to die, the fol-
lowing four factors should be balanced against the chances of
recovery a person faces with the proposed treatment. First,
whether recovery will be complete. Second, whether adminis-
tration of the treatments will be limited, or will have to con-
tinue for the remainder of the person's life. Third, what type
of medical procedure will be involved? Is the procedure one
deemed ordinary or extraordinary? Will the treatments cause
any unpleasant side effects, particularly any that will interfere
with the person's lifestyle? 9 Finally, in the case of persons
seeking to exercise the right to die for religious reasons,
special weight should be given the first amendment issues
involved. 0
58. Although the philosophical argument of this comment supporting the right
to die could theoretically be extended to its outer limits to encompass active suicide,
this comment is limited to a treatment of the right to die, defined as "passive eutha-
nasia." See note 1 supra. Some forms of action that are not clearly active suicide are
also not argued for in this comment. The non-active situations that the legal test here
developed would not protect might be classified as "passive suicide." Practical consid-
erations, in this case the outer limit of behavior that most of society is ready to ac-
cept, contribute to defining the line at which the protected right to die stops.
59. An example of the type of situation that would fall within this questionable
continuum is the case of a person suffering from renal failure. Using dialysis the pa-
tient's chances of recovery are probably fairly good. Against this fairly good prospect
four factors must be balanced. First, will the recovery be complete? Given present
medical techniques, no. Once the function of a major organ is permanently lost, the
process cannot be reversed unless the patient receives a transplant. Thus, assuming
that this patient is not a good candidate for a transplant, in at least one sense, recov-
ery will not be complete. The second factor, length of treatments, is, in this case the
remainder of the patient's life. Third, what type of treatments will be involved, ordi-
nary or extraordinary? Only a generation ago, dialysis was practically unheard of.
Today, it is becoming more common. It lies in the grey area of classification as far as
this factor is concerned. It does perform an organ function artificially. Without it,
death is certain; with it, death is distant for many. The side effects of the treatment
can be substantial. In addition to frequent trips to a medical facility, the treatments
themselves require a large investment upon the part of the patient. It has also been
reported to have debilitating side effects on many. It does have unpleasant side ef-
fects that might interfere with the patient's lifestyle. The factors appear heavily
weighted in favor of allowing a person in such a situation -to refuse the treatment.
60. Most of the cases that have dealt with the right to refuse medical treatment
and the right to die were brought by persons seeking to exercise their first amend-
ment right to the free exercise of religion as well as the right to die. See, e.g., United
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v.
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Cases On the Right To Die Examined in Light of Maximum
Scrutiny
Only a few courts have had occasion to decide whether a
person has a right to die. Even fewer have recognized the
right. How does the reasoning of these cases fare under the
maximum scrutiny test?
In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that "there is no constitu-
tional right to choose to die."61 The court forced the defen-
dant to submit to medical treatment. The court grounded its
decision on the state's interest in the life of its citizens.2
Closely related to this interest, was the state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from destroying themselves." Both these
interests fail to meet the compelling harm requirement of the
maximum scrutiny test. The second interest, protection from
self, results in no harm of any kind to other members of soci-
ety. The first interest would not result in harm great enough
to justify restricting the defendant's right to die.
The interest of the medical personnel in practicing
medicine according to the dictates of their own values was the
second basis advanced by the court for its decision to force
treatment." Included with this, was a concern for the liability
to which the doctors might be subjected if they failed to ad-
minister treatment.e5 This concern for liability and personal
values fails the second requirement of the maximum scrutiny
test. It is not the least restrictive means of furthering these
interests. The court could have provided immunity from lia-
bility for the medical personnel involved, along with a deci-
sion to permit the defendant to decline treatment. 6 A similar
provision could have been made allowing anyone who wished,
to remove himself from participation in the patient's decision.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (Jehovah's Witnesses refused the right to
decline medical treatment).
61. 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971).
62. Id. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. For an extended discussion of potential physician liability, see Com-
ment, Euthanasia: The Physician's Liability, 10 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 173
(1976).
66. Only five years later, the New Jersey court did precisely this. Matter of
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 672, cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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In re Osborne67 is one of the few cases in which a person
was allowed to refuse medical treatment. The court in that
case applied a maximum scrutiny test 8 and held that interfer-
ence with a person's right to refuse medical treatment could
be justified only by a compelling state interest." The thrust of
the decision was qualified. The patient's right was conditioned
on the fact that he had provided financially for his minor chil-
dren.7 0 The denial of the right to one not wealthy enough to
provide for his dependents is implicit in this condition. Would
the financial burden placed upon the state in caring for the
dependents of a person who exercised the right to die be suffi-
cient to satisfy the compelling state interest standard? The
result in Shapiro v. Thompson7 1 suggests that wealth classifi-
cations that restrict exercise of a constitutional right will be
strictly scrutinized.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a limited
right to die in Matter of Quinlan.72 The reasoning of the court
in that decision was in opposition to the approach of the max-
imum scrutiny test. The court focused initially on the para-
mount state interest in the life of its citizens. The court con-
cluded, however, that the state's interest "weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily in-
vasion increases and the prognosis dims. ' 73 A point is finally
reached at which the privacy interest of the individual over-
rides the state's interest in preserving life. No compelling jus-
tification is required of the state. Instead, the burden is on the
person seeking to exercise the right to die to prove a compel-
ling need to override the state's interest.7' Although the Quin-
lan court did recognize a privacy right in connection with the
right to die it did not afford the right full measure of protec-
tion it deserves under the constitution. 5
67. 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972).
68. Id. at 375.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (right to travel may not be penalized by purely
financial state interests).
72. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
73. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
74. Id.
75. It is interesting to note the similarities between the approach taken by the
Quinlan court, and that taken by the United States Supreme Court in the area of
criminal law and bodily invasion. In Rochin v. California, the Court found that
emetics administered by force shock the conscience, and therefore violate the Due
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In the recent case of Matter of Spring,"6 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed an order of the Pro-
bate Court requiring an incompetent patient's physician, wife
and son to decide whether to terminate dialysis treatment.
Justice Braucher based his decision for the court on the pa-
tient's privacy rights to prevent invasion of bodily integrity. 77
He noted that
a competent person has a general right to refuse medical
treatment in appropriate circumstances, to be determined
by balancing the individual interest against counter-
vailing State interests, particularly the State interest in
the preservation of life. In striking that balance, account
is to be taken of the prognosis and of the magnitude of
the proposed invasion.7 8
The court extended the right to incompetent persons, to be
exercised through substituted judgment.79
Although the opinion contains strong language supporting
the right to bodily integrity,s0 the court did not apply maxi-
mum scrutiny, using instead, a balancing test. As in Quinlan,
the invasiveness of the procedure was given heavy weight.81
Additionally, the state's interest in life, preventing suicide,
and the interests of third parties were considered. Although
the court found that the interests of the incompetent patient
in this case were controlling, it noted that in the proper case
countervailing state interests may be sufficient to block exer-
cise of the right to die.8s Although a strong step, Matter of
Spring severely limits the protection given the right to die.83
Other recent decisions have also allowed termination of
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
Six years later in Breithaupt v. Abram, a blood sample taken from a suspect
without his consent was found not to violate due process standards. The Court noted
that "the blood test procedure has become routine in everyday life." The intrusion of
the defendant's body was found to be too slight to justify protecting him against the
greater interests of society. 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
76. 405 N.E. 2d 115 (1980).
77. Id. at 119.
78. Id.
79. Id. See Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
80. 405 N.E. 2d at 119.
81. Id. at 122, 123.
82. Id. See text accompanying notes 62-71 supra.
83. The countervailing state interests, in particular, do not seem compelling, in
Spring.
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medical treatment in limited situations. In Satz v. Perlmut-
ter," the Florida Supreme Court held that "a competent
adult patient, with no minor dependents, suffering from a
terminal illness has the constitutional right to refuse or dis-
continue extraordinary medical treatment where all affected
family members consent."86 The right in this case is qualified
by reference to the absence of minor dependents, "extra-
ordinary medical treatment," and consent of affected family
members.
Application of EichnersO also grants a limited right to re-
fuse treatment. Eichner involved an application to appoint a
committee to act on behalf of an incompetent patient and to
seek permission to terminate treatment. Eichner did not base
this right on privacy, but rather on a general common law
right to bodily integrity.8 7 Once again, the court severely lim-
ited the application of the right, saying it is
subject to being overriden by State interests in appropri-
ate circumstances. Among the state interests which must
be weighed are interests in the protection of third parties,
such as minor children, the maintenance of latitude for
physicians and hospitals to fulfill their ethical obligations
and, by far the most important, the preservation of all
human life."
The court limited the exercise of the right to "artificial life-
sustaining treatment," and to "narrow and extreme
circumstances. "89
Although the Eichner court rejected the Quinlan substi-
tuted judgment analysis for cases involving incompetents, it
used language similar to that of Quinlan, saying the court
must ascertain the decision the person "would make if he be-
came competent for a moment and consciously faced his afflic-
tions." 0 The court found that withdrawal of treatment was
permissible because of the severity of the situation and be-
cause there was substantial evidence that withdrawal com-
84. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
85. Id. at 360.
86. 423 N.Y.S. 2d 580 (1980).
87. Id. at 590-93.
88. Id. at 593.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 597.
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ported with the patient's previously expressed desires.91
The constitutional right to die should be recognized and
given maximum scrutiny protection. Most courts have been
unwilling to find such a right except under very limited cir-
cumstances. Thus, judicial application of the right has not
been uniform. Courts are understandably wary of the
problems of liability for medical personnel, and of the sensi-
tive nature of the subject. Case-by-case recognition of the
right to die is proving too slow to meet the needs created by
our fast-paced technology. Legislative action in this area can
more easily overcome these problems. Legislation can insure
uniformity of the right itself, and uniform solutions of the at-
tendant problems of liability. The California Natural Death
Act"' is the first legislative attempt to resolve these problems.
THE CALIFORNIA NATURAL DEATH ACT: A STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION
On September 30, 1976, California became the first state
to statutorily recognize a right to die when it enacted the Nat-
ural Death Act (CNDA).93 The California Constitution guar-
antees the right to privacy." The legislature based the act on
91. Id.
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAnrTY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1980).
93. For a discussion of factors leading to enactment of the CNDA, see Redleaf,
Schmitt & Thompson, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of
Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REv. 913 (1970).
94. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution reads: "All people ...
have inalienable rights. Among those are... pursuing and obtaining... privacy."
In People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979), the California Supreme Court narrowed the right to pri-
vacy under the California Constitution to exclude bodily integrity. The defendants in
Privitera appealed a conviction of conspiracy to sell and prescribe an unproven can-
cer treatment-laetrile. The California Supreme Court held that neither the federal
nor the state constitutional privacy right protected the "right to obtain drugs of un-
proven efficacy." The court found that the privacy right under the federal constitu-
tion did not include medical treatment decisions. They relied on Roe v. Wade to
support use of a rational basis test when dealing with a danger to health. In this case,
the test was met. Id. at 701-02, 709, 591 P.2d at 921-22, 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34,
438.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird makes a strong argument that both state and
federal privacy rights prevent state interference with treatment choice based on the
treatment's efficacy. Id. at 711-741, 591 P. 2d at 927-946, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 439-458.
Chief Justice Bird considers Rutherford v. United States, 582 F. 2d 1234 (10th Cir.
1978), rev'd and remanded, 544 U.S. 442 (1979), reheard, 616 F.2d 455 (1980), a guide
to determination of the issues in Privitera. The majority in Privitera, however, distin-
guished Rutherford. They noted that "unlike Rutherford, [Privitera] is not an action
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the right of privacy and on the "right to control the decisions
relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including
the decision to have life-saving procedures withheld or with-
drawn in instances of a terminal condition."9 The CNDA
comes into play, however, only if certain requirements are
met. A direction to withdraw or withhold treatment can be
executed by a competent adult at any time under the
CNDA.' Once executed, a directive remains effective for five
years.' It may be revoked at any time thereby cancelling the
document."8 Unless one is a qualified patient within the defi-
nition of the CNDA, however, any directive executed will not
have the full force of the "conclusive presumption" provided
for by the CNDA." What entitles a person to status as a qual-
ified patient under the CNDA? Within its definition of those
protected by the right, lie most of the constitutional problems
of the CNDA.
Constitutional Defects of the CNDA
The CNDA contains three major constitutional defects.
First, the right recognized in the statute excludes many who
should be protected by the right to die. Second, the defini-
tions in the CNDA are so vague and ambiguous it is often
difficult to tell who is or is not protected. Finally, so much
discretion is given to the physician involved that the choice
may not be made independently, but must be conditioned on
physician-approval.100
on behalf of the class of terminally ill cancer patients." 23 Cal. 3d at 707, 591 P. 2d at
925, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
This distinction between Rutherford and Privitera might provide an opening for
upholding the right to die. Presumably, the California court would uphold the right
to die in those cases falling within the California Natural Death Act. See text accom-
panying notes 92-99 supra. This seems especially likely in light of Privitera's ratio-
nale of deference to legislative judgments. However, the strong language in Privitera
indicates that pursuit of the right to die as a derivitive of privacy is foreclosed.
In contrast to Privitera, the Rutherford court, on remand recognized that at least
"the decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or not is a protected right"
under the constitutional right of privacy. 616 F.2d 455, 457 (1980). Clearly, this inter-
pretation of those aspects of treatment decision covered by privacy allows protection
of the right to die.
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAWNTY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1980).
96. Id. § 7188.
97. Id. § 7189.5.
98. Id. § 7189.
99. Id. § 7191(b).
100. Id. §§ 7187(c), (e), (f) & 7191(c).
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The CNDA guarantees the right to have artificial proce-
dures withheld from a person whose death is "imminent.' 10 1
Unfortunately, persons who fall in the area between active su-
icide and imminently terminal are denied protection. Addi-
tionally, no provision is made for exercise of the right to die
based on religious grounds. The CNDA thus invades both
fourteenth and first amendment rights.
The second problem, the vagueness and ambiguities in
the definitions, is probably the CNDA's most serious defect.
The definition of the type of procedures that may be with-
drawn contains an inherent conflict-such procedures are
those that artificially prolong the life of the patient.10 2 At the
same time, a patient only qualifies under the CNDA if he is
terminal whether or not the procedures are administered. 10 If
a person is imminently terminal, then none of the medical
procedures that might be given to him will prolong his life, if
a procedure would prolong a person's life significantly, then
he is not imminently terminal.
Added to the ambiguities on the face of the statute, are
the problems stemming from lack of uniformity within the
medical profession. Because the decision whether to withdraw
treatment is conditional on the approval of the physician,'
current medical standards will have a substantial effect on
whether a person is deemed imminently terminal and on
whether a procedure is deemed to artificially prolong life.
There is great controversy within the medical profession as to
which procedures are artificial or extraordinary and which are
not.10 5 In one study, over eight percent of the medical profes-
sion stated that they would consider a person imminently ter-
minal only if death were to occur within a week or less.'06 Be-
cause the CNDA provides that a directive becomes binding
only if executed (or re-executed) within fourteen days after a
person has been classified and informed that he is imminently
terminal,10 7 many people will not be able to execute binding
directives under the CNDA.
101. Id. § 7187(0.
102. Id. § 7187(c).
103. Id. at § 7187(c), (f).
104. Id. at §§ 7187(c), (e), (f) & 7191(e).
105. See, e.g., Redleaf, Schmitt & Thompson, supra note 82, at 932-33.
106. Id. at 933 n.92.
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1980).
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Finally, the large amount of discretion given to the physi-
cian in implementing this right unjustifiably restricts exercise
of the right to die.10 8 The right to die protects the right of the
individual to decide what medical treatment he will use or not
use and his right to control his own body. Conditioning the
right on physician approval removes a large measure of the
control insured by the right. The CNDA gives even more
discretion to the physician in that, if a directive does not
qualify for the status of a conclusive presumption under the
CNDA, it need not be followed by the physician; 0 9 it is advi-
sory only. 110 Finally, there is no procedure for positive asser-
tion of the right if the physician refuses to follow the direc-
tive, the only sanction he is subject to is a finding of
professional misconduct."'
If not perfect, the CNDA at least represents a major step
towards recognition of the right to die. It needs to be
amended to provide clarity in defining the procedures that
may be withdrawn or withheld. The class of persons the
CNDA protects should be expanded. A provision utilizing a
balance of various factors, such as those discussed in this com-
ment under the legal test for the right to die," 2 should be
added to the CNDA so that both persons within the contin-
uum and persons seeking to exercise religious belief could
take advantage of the CNDA.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the California Natural Death Act, the Legisla-
ture limited the right to die by including provisions to assuage
their fears. Great discretion is given the physician for fear the
patient will not know his own best interests. The right is nar-
rowly restricted and vaguely defined to prevent premature ex-
ercise of the right. Courts and commentators, too, have based
their decisions on fear. They advanced a "wedge" theory to
deny the right to die, fearing this right will lead to eugenics.
Citizens are afraid of the right to die because they are con-
fused about what it means.
108. Id. §§ 7187(c), (e), (f) & 7191(e).
109. Id. § 7191(c).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 7191(b).
112. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
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This comment has attempted to dispel some of the confu-
sion. In the sections dealing with the philosophical and consti-
tutional considerations, the right to die was seen as an aspect
of liberty. To exercise liberty, privacy shields an individual
from interference with intimate decisions. No decision is more
intimate than the choice to die; it is an exercise of the right to
control our own lives, and is therefore the antithesis of
eugenics.
From the confusion, stem the fears that prevent recogni-
tion of the right to die, and when the right is not recognized,
liberty is curtailed. This is the real "wedge," for if the govern-
ment can justify removing our most basic right, control of our
bodies, which lesser rights are safe?
Chris Beraldo

